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525 
Searching for a Trademarks Test: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Query in Network Automation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.,1 
the Ninth Circuit changed the direction of its internet trademark law 
when it declined to apply the “troika” factors2 to determine whether 
one’s use of another’s trademark as a search-engine keyword violates 
the Lanham Act.3 The court established the internet troika test in 
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.4 
and consistently applied it to the internet context for more than a 
decade.5 But the Ninth Circuit in Network Automation instead 
favored a flexible application of an eight-factor test from its earlier 
decision in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats.6 The court used this flexible 
application to produce a new test made up of three Sleekcraft factors 
distinct from the troika combined with a fourth new factor.7 
The Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Network Automation are flawed 
for two reasons. First, because the district court properly applied 
Ninth Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the 
district court applied an erroneous legal standard. Second, the Ninth 
Circuit failed to limit clearly the troika test and to define the 
appropriate contexts for its future use. These flaws create confusion 
about which test applies in trademark infringement cases for 
emerging technologies. This Note examines the Ninth Circuit’s 
method of crafting new tests for cases involving new internet  
 
 
 1. 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 2. The troika test consists of the following three factors: “(1) the similarity of the 
marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as 
a marketing channel.” Id. at 1148. The three troika factors are a subset of the eight factors 
established in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006). 
 4. 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 n.16 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 5. See, e.g., Perfumebay.com v. eBay, 506 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 6. 599 F.2d at 348–49. 
 7. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1154 
(9th Cir. 2011). None of the Sleekcraft factors in the new test are a part of the troika. Id. 
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technologies and offers a model that judges can follow in future 
emerging-technology cases. 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II details trademark case law 
from the online keyword search context. Part III contains the 
relevant facts and procedural history of Network Automation. Part IV 
describes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and holding. Finally, Part V 
analyzes Network Automation, explains the difficulties caused by the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, and proposes a clear method for judges to 
determine which factors are relevant in future internet trademark 
cases. 
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To demonstrate infringement of a registered trademark under 
the Lanham Act,8 a party “must prove (1) that it has a protectable 
ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that the defendant’s use of 
the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.”9 While trademark 
law prohibits multiple types of confusion, two types are relevant in 
the online keyword context: source confusion and initial interest 
confusion.10 Source confusion occurs when a consumer is confused 
about the source or origin of a product.11 Initial interest confusion 
occurs when a consumer initially becomes interested in a product 
based on confusion about the product’s origin, even if the 
misunderstanding is resolved before the consumer’s purchase.12 
In AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,13 the Ninth Circuit established a 
test that considers eight relevant factors for determining likelihood of 
confusion for purposes of trademark infringement. The relevant 
factors are: “(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; 
(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) 
marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care 
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in 
selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product 
 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
 9. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. 
Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 10. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
 13. 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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lines.”14 Courts consider these factors in light of “all the relevant 
circumstances in assessing the likelihood of confusion.”15 This test 
has become foundational in assessing the likelihood of confusion in 
all trademark cases in the Ninth Circuit. 
In Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment,16 the 
Ninth Circuit “first confronted issues of trademark infringement and 
consumer confusion in the Internet context.”17 In Brookfield, a 
provider of entertainment-industry information sued a video-rental 
store for its internet-related use of the term “MovieBuff,” including 
“moviebuff.com.”18 The Ninth Circuit applied the Sleekcraft test, 
noting that it is “pliant,” that “the relative importance of each 
individual factor will be case-specific,” and that it may be possible to 
use “only a subset of the factors” or use “non-listed variables.”19 
However, the Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that “some factors—
such as the similarity of the marks and whether the two companies 
are direct competitors—will always be important.”20  
Of the eight factors in Sleekcraft, the Ninth Circuit primarily 
relied on three factors, which would come to be known as the 
internet “troika,” in holding that there was a likelihood of 
confusion.21 The first factor is the similarity of the marks: “[T]he 
more similar the marks in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning, 
the greater the likelihood of confusion.”22 The second factor is the 
relatedness of the goods or services. This factor examines whether 
the two parties are competitors as well as “the competitive proximity 
of their products.”23 The third factor is simultaneous use of the web 
as a marketing channel.24 In addition to these three factors, the 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 348 (citing Durox Co. v. Duron Paint Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 882, 885 (4th Cir. 
1963)). 
 16. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 17. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1145 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
 18. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1041. 
 19. Id. at 1054. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1058. 
 22. Id. at 1054 (citing Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 
1131 (9th Cir. 1998); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
 23. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1056. 
 24. Id. at 1057. 
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Ninth Circuit offered the following guidance: “We must be acutely 
aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet 
context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”25 The 
Ninth Circuit applied these factors to the domain name context, 
holding that “moviebuff.com” was confusingly similar to 
“MovieBuff,” and accordingly enjoined West Coast’s use of 
“moviebuff.com.”26 
The Brookfield court also considered a different but related 
question: Is it permissible for one to use another’s trademark in a 
website’s metatags?27 Metatags, hidden from a typical viewer, are 
keywords buried in the HTML code of a website that assist search 
engines in indexing website content.28 While acknowledging that 
source confusion was unlikely to result from one’s use of another’s 
trademark in metatags to affect search engine results, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that initial interest confusion may nevertheless exist.29 
The court clarified its reasoning regarding metatags in the trademark 
context with this hypothetical: 
Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts 
up a billboard on a highway reading—”West Coast Video: 2 miles 
ahead at Exit 7”—where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but 
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West 
Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. 
Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right 
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there.30 
Even though consumers “are fully aware” in the end that they 
are renting from Blockbuster and not West Coast, “the fact that 
there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that 
Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast’s acquired 
goodwill.”31 This initial interest confusion alone was sufficient for 
the Brookfield court to bar the use of trademarked terms in metatags 
 
 25. Id. at 1054. 
 26. Id. at 1061. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Jonathan Moskin, Virtual Trademark Use—The Parallel World of Keyword Ads, 
98 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 887 (2008). Google and other modern search engines rarely still 
use metatags in their search engine algorithms. Id. 
 29. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1062. 
 30. Id. at 1064. 
 31. Id. 
ISRAELSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:58 AM 
525 Searching for a Trademarks Test 
 529 
in addition to domain names.32 However, the court did not 
completely bar the use of a competitor’s trademarked terms in the 
internet context.33 A trademarked term can still be used to describe a 
competitor’s product.34 For example, it would be acceptable for West 
Coast to display a web advertisement stating, “Why pay for 
MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for FREE?”35 
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit considered a new search 
advertising technology involving the use of trademarked terms in 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.36 In this 
case, Netscape required adult-oriented advertisers to link their 
banner ads to a list of over 400 adult and sexually oriented terms, 
including two terms trademarked by Playboy, “playboy” and 
“playmate.”37 The Ninth Circuit, relying on Brookfield, found that 
Netscape’s use of trademarked terms created initial interest confusion 
and therefore was actionable.38 The court reasoned that “actual 
confusion is at the heart of the likelihood of confusion analysis,”39 
but still applied the eight-factor Sleekcraft test.40 It held that the 
strength of the mark, proximity of the goods, similarity of the marks, 
type of goods and degree of consumer care expected, and 
defendant’s intent all favored a holding of likelihood of 
infringement.41 
In Perfumebay.com v. eBay, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the 
troika factors are the most important for determining likelihood of 
confusion “[i]n the internet context.”42 Perfumebay.com sought a 
declaratory judgment that “Perfumebay” did not infringe on the 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1066. 
 34. See id. (Use of a trademarked term for comparative advertising is considered fair 
use.). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). Playboy’s suit was based on Netscape’s practice of 
“keying.” Keying was a practice used by advertisers to display banner ads that were linked to 
internet searches by “keying” their ads to certain lists of words. When a search engine user 
entered a term from a list, the banner ads keyed to that list would be displayed. Id. at 1022. 
 37. Id. at 1023. 
 38. Id. at 1025. 
 39. Id. at 1027. 
 40. Id. at 1026–29. 
 41. Id. at 1027–29. 
 42. 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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“eBay” mark.43 One eBay employee testified that searches for the 
keywords “perfume eBay” elicited sponsored ads for Perfumebay’s 
website.44 The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n the internet context, 
‘the three most important Sleek craft factors in evaluating a 
likelihood of confusion are’” the troika factors.45 The court also 
noted that the eight-factor Sleekcraft test, which “guides the 
assessment of whether a likelihood of confusion exists,”46 should be 
fluid.47 The court held that because these “three most important” 
factors—the “internet trilogy”—weighed against Perfumebay, there 
was a valid basis for initial interest confusion. 48 As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s permanent injunction against 
using perfumebay.com and perfume-bay.com.49 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Facts of the Case 
Advanced Systems Concepts (“Systems”) is a software 
development and consulting firm that developed the ActiveBatch 
software, an enterprise software product that assists businesses with 
centralized task management.50 Systems began using the ActiveBatch 
trademark in 2000 and registered the mark with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office in 2001.51 Network Automation (“Network”), 
also a software development firm, is a direct competitor of Systems.52 
Network developed the AutoMate software, which is also an 
enterprise software program for integrating and automating various 
 
 43. Id. at 1168. 
 44. Id. at 1170. 
 45. Id. at 1173 (quoting Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 
942 (9th Cir. 2002)). The troika factors are “(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness 
of the goods and services, and (3) the parties’ simultaneous use of the web as a marketing 
channel.” Id. 
 46. Id. (citing Reno Air Racing Ass’n. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
 47. Id. (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 
2005)). 
 48. Id. at 1173–74. 
 49. Id. at 1176–77. 
 50. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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business tasks, applications, and technologies.53 AutoMate directly 
competes with ActiveBatch.54 
Network used Google AdWords and Microsoft adCenter to 
display ads each time a user searched for the keyword 
“ActiveBatch.”55 Google56 AdWords is a program that allows a 
website owner to create ads and choose the “keywords,” or search 
terms, that trigger the display of those ads.57 Keyword-specific 
advertising allows advertisers to target their ads based on users’ 
search terms. Google pitches the program as a way to “advertis[e] to 
an audience that’s already interested.”58 When a user clicks on an ad, 
the user is redirected to a website pre-designated by the advertiser, 
and Google charges the advertiser for the click.59 Microsoft’s Bing 
search engine offers a similar service called adCenter.60 Google or 
Bing61 users who searched for the keyword “ActiveBatch,”62 a 
trademark owned by Systems, were shown Network’s ad in a 
“Sponsored Links” or “Sponsored Sites” section of the search results 
page.63 Network’s advertisements included text such as “Job 
Scheduler” or “Batch Job Scheduling,” and also included the 
company’s website, NetworkAutomation.com.64 
In November 2009, Systems demanded that Network stop using 
the ActiveBatch mark in search engine advertising because Network 
was “not ‘authorized to use’” the ActiveBatch mark in commerce.65 
 
 53. Id.; see also NETWORK AUTOMATION, http://www.networkautomation.com (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
 54. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1142. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Google’s market share of the desktop search engine was 78% as of Mar. 9, 2012. 
Search Engine Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE, http://www.netmarketshare.com/search-
engine-market-share.aspx?qprid=4 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 57. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1142. 
 58. GOOGLE ADWORDS, https://adwords.google.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 59. Id. 
 60. MICROSOFT ADVERTISING ADCENTER, https://adcenter.microsoft.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 61. While the case made no mention of other search engines, the Ninth Circuit has 
previously recognized that Yahoo!, Altavista, and Lycos are examples of other internet search 
engines. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 62. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1143. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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Systems argued that Network’s keyword advertising infringed on its 
mark.66 In response, Network filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory 
judgment of non infringement.67 Systems counterclaimed, alleging 
trademark infringement and moving for a preliminary injunction 
against Network.68 
B. Procedural History 
The district court granted System’s injunction against Network, 
holding that Network infringed on System’s trademark because 
Network used the mark in commerce.69 While the district court 
considered all eight factors of the Sleekcraft test, it followed Ninth 
Circuit precedent regarding internet cases and focused on the three 
troika factors: “(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of 
the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the web as a 
marketing channel.”70 The district court found that all three factors 
weighed in favor of Systems.71 It also concluded that three other 
Sleekcraft factors weighed in favor of Systems and that the remaining 
two did not apply.72 The district court found that Network’s 
keyword advertising was impermissible because it created “initial 
interest confusion.”73 Because of these findings, the district court 
concluded that Systems was likely to prevail on its trademark 
infringement claim, that Systems would suffer irreparable harm, and 
that the public interest favored Systems.74 The district court granted 
a preliminary injunction based on these findings.75 Network then 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.76 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. These three factors are known as the “troika” test or the “internet trilogy.” 
 71. Id. at 1143–44. 
 72. Id. at 1149–54. The others factors that weighed in favor of Systems were (1) the 
strength of the mark, (2) type of goods and degree of care, and (3) defendant’s intent. Id. The 
factors that did not apply were (1) evidence of actual confusion, and (2) likelihood of 
expansion of the product lines. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1144. Note that the district court found “initial interest confusion” instead of 
finding “source confusion.” 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that there 
was a likelihood of confusion.77 The district court abused its 
discretion by erroneously relying on the troika factors when it should 
have been more flexible and applied all of the Sleekcraft factors.78 
The Ninth Circuit combined its own step-by-step analysis of all eight 
Sleekcraft factors with its consideration of other relevant factors to 
articulate a new test for search–keyword cases.79 Applying this new 
test, the court held that there was no likelihood of confusion in this 
case.80 
A. What Test to Apply 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s application of the 
troika factors as overly rigid. It noted, “We must be acutely aware of 
excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; 
emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”81 Explaining that 
“it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors for every type 
of potential online commercial activity,” the court rejected the troika 
factors for application in this context.82 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the appropriate analysis instead includes a flexible application of all 
the Sleekcraft factors, as well as an examination of the surrounding 
circumstances.83 The court declared that this test should be applied 
with an eye to the “sine qua non84 of trademark infringement”–
“consumer confusion.”85 
After analyzing all eight Sleekcraft factors,86 the court concluded 
that a new test was more relevant for this context. The factors in the 
Ninth Circuit’s new test included three Sleekcraft factors, all distinct 
from the troika factors: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the 
 
 77. Id. at 1154. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1149–54. 
 80. Id. at 1154. 
 81. Id. at 1141–42 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 82. Id. at 1148. 
 83. Id. at 1149. 
 84. Sine qua non means an essential element or condition. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1418 (8th ed. 2004). 
 85. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149. 
 86. Id. at 1149–54. 
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evidence of actual confusion; and (3) the type of goods and degree 
of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser.87 Additionally, the 
court added a fourth, new factor, (4) the labeling and appearance of 
the advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen 
displaying the results page.88 
B. The Application of the Test 
After evaluating the significance of each Sleekcraft factor, the 
Ninth Circuit determined whether each factor favored a finding of 
likelihood of confusion.89 While the court did not explicitly conclude 
whether there was a likelihood of confusion, its step-by-step analysis 
of the Sleekcraft factors suggests that the balance of the factors 
weighed against holding that confusion was likely.90 The Ninth 
Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s grant of the injunction91 also 
indicates that the court felt confusion was unlikely.92 
V. ANALYSIS 
In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit made a distinct shift 
in its approach to trademark law on the internet. This shift is 
problematic because rather than acknowledging and explaining its 
break with precedent, the Ninth Circuit merely redefined prior case 
law, which changed the direction of the law without actually 
overturning cases. The result is an unclear standard that will leave 
judges and practitioners confused and unsure about the correct 
approach to trademark law and emerging technologies. 
A. The District Court’s Approach Was Not Clearly Erroneous 
The district court’s approach, which the Ninth Circuit 
overturned under the abuse of discretion standard, was not 
unreasonable in light of case law and Ninth Circuit precedent. The 
 
 87. Id. at 1154. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1149–54. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1154. 
 92. One of the factors that must be established in order for a court to grant a 
preliminary injunction is the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. Winter v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Thus the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the 
injunction implies that the Ninth Circuit did not agree that Systems was likely to prevail. 
ISRAELSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:58 AM 
525 Searching for a Trademarks Test 
 535 
district court analyzed each of the Sleekcraft factors, but identified 
Brookfield’s troika as the most important because this was an 
“Internet” case.93 The Ninth Circuit claimed that this was an 
erroneous legal standard, pointing to Brookfield’s single use of the 
word “flexible” as evidence that the troika test was not meant to 
apply to all internet-related cases.94 Determining whether Brookfield 
applies to all internet cases is unnecessary because in this case, the 
facts are quite analogous to those of Brookfield. The Brookfield court, 
in analyzing the use of trademark terms in metatags, specifically 
noted that if an infringer’s use of a competitor’s trademark affects 
search engine results, thereby attracting additional website visitors, 
the infringer’s actions create initial interest confusion.95 
Moreover, there seems to be little difference between the 
technologies at issue in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape 
Communications Corp.96 and Network Automation,97 which suggests 
that there should be little difference in the legal outcomes. In 
Playboy, Netscape’s search-engine results displayed banner ads that 
had been linked to lists of words.98 Because those lists included 
trademarked terms, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was 
“strong support” for “a high likelihood of initial interest 
confusion.”99 The Ninth Circuit analyzed all eight Sleekcraft factors, 
but found “evidence of actual confusion” to be the most 
important.100 In Network Automation, although the underlying 
technology was slightly different,101 the search engine results still 
displayed ads in response to trademarked search terms. Because 
trademark law is focused on what the consumer experiences or 
 
 93. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148. 
 94. Id. at 1145–46. 
 95. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
 96. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 97. In Network Automation, an advertiser paid to display a text ad in response to a 
search for a trademarked term (the keyword). 638 F.3d at 1143. In Playboy, an advertiser paid 
to display a banner ad in response to a search for one of a list of words, at least one of which 
was a trademarked term. 354 F.3d at 1023. 
 98. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1023. 
 99. Id. at 1026–27. 
 100. Id. at 1026–29. 
 101. In Playboy, the trademarked term was part of a list of words “keyed” to display 
banner ads in response to a search including a word on a list. In Network Automation, the ad 
corresponded directly to an individual term. 
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believes,102 and in both cases the consumer experiences a similar 
result, it hardly seems erroneous for the district court in Network 
Automation to come to a similar conclusion as Playboy. Indeed, the 
Ninth Circuit even recognized that there was “similarity” between 
Network Automation, Playboy, and Brookfield.103 Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court under the abuse of 
discretion standard was inappropriate. 
Given how similar the facts of Perfumebay were to those of 
Network Automation, it hardly seems erroneous for the district court, 
in each case, to apply a similar standard and reach a similar outcome. 
In both cases, a search that included one party’s trademarked term 
resulted in the display of a competitor’s paid advertisements for their 
competing product alongside the search results.104 Examining these 
facts in Perfumebay, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n the internet 
context, ‘the three most important Sleekcraft factors in evaluating a 
likelihood of confusion’” are the troika factors from Brookfield.105 A 
mere four years later, the district court in Network Automation 
followed the Ninth Circuit’s approach and applied the troika factors 
“in the internet context”106—a statement that hardly seems 
ambiguous at all. 
Because the district court’s decision was in line with Ninth 
Circuit precedent, it is difficult to understand how the Ninth Circuit 
could hold that the district court’s approach was based on “an 
erroneous legal standard”107 without overturning the case law on 
which the district court’s decision was based. The abuse of discretion 
standard does give some deference to lower court judges. Indeed, 
the Ninth Circuit in Network Automation had to find “an erroneous 
legal standard or . . . clearly erroneous findings of fact” in order to 
reverse the district court on abuse of discretion grounds.108 The 
district court could not have abused its discretion in this case since its 
 
 102. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
Yale L.J. 882, 908 (2007) (“Consumer perception is trademark law’s touchstone.”). 
 103. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1147 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
 104. Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 105. Id. at 1173–74 (emphasis added) (citing Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, 
Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 106. Id. at 1173. 
 107. Network Automation, 633 F.3d at 1144. 
 108. Id. 
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decision was in line with the Ninth Circuit’s long history of applying 
the troika factors in a variety of internet cases—including search 
engine cases.109 Because the district court’s approach was the one 
favored by precedent, in reversing the district court’s approach under 
the abuse of discretion standard, it seems that the mistake was not 
actually on the part of the district court, but was in fact a result of 
the Ninth Circuit’s own misstep in establishing an “erroneous legal 
standard” for internet trademark law to begin with. 
B. The New Rule: Wait, Which Rule Applies? 
In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit muddied the 
water regarding the appropriate standard that should be applied 
going forward. While the court explicitly rejected the troika 
approach for keyword cases,110 it failed to limit the troika test’s 
application in general. This failure to clearly define when the troika 
test applies–and when it does not apply–will likely cause confusion 
among practitioners and judges in future cases when they must 
decide what test is proper. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to 
clearly establish a test for district courts to apply when faced with 
new emerging technologies in the context of trademark 
infringement. 
1. When troika applies 
In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the 
troika factors for “search engine keyword advertising.”111 Although 
the court clearly approved the test for “analyz[ing] the risk of source 
confusion generated by similar domain names” and “disputes 
involving websites with similar names or appearances,”112 the court 
did not limit the test to these situations. 
The court’s rationale for rejecting the troika factors in keyword-
advertising cases is flawed. To support its proposition that “the 
‘troika’ is a particularly poor fit for the question presented” in 
Network Automation, the court cited a single journal article.113 The 
 
 109. For example, the district court referenced Brookfield and Playboy in its decision to 
apply the troika standard in Network Automation. Id. at 1148. 
 110. Id. at 1148–49. 
 111. Id. at 1149. 
 112. Id. at 1148. 
 113. Id. at 1148–49. The referenced article is Jonathan Moskin, Virtual Trademark 
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court characterized the article as “arguing that the ‘troika’ is 
inadequate for . . . search engine keyword advertising because it 
omits important factors.”114 But the court’s reliance on this article is 
curious. If a test is inadequate, the logical fix is to add whatever is 
missing so that the test becomes adequate.115 Instead, the court 
completely rejected—rather than supplemented—the troika factors, 
then replaced them with three different Sleekcraft factors116 and a 
fourth factor never before seen117 in the Ninth Circuit.118 The court’s 
grasping citation to authority confused—rather than clarified—its 
decision. Instead, the court should have clearly stated the logical 
reasons that made the troika test inapposite, not merely inadequate. 
Because the Ninth Circuit did not overturn precedent, yet still broke 
with it, the court’s reasoning is confusing and offers little assistance 
to those wishing to apply Network Automation to future cases. 
Flexibility would not have changed the district court’s outcome, 
despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the district court applied 
the wrong legal standard because it failed to be flexible in weighing 
the Sleekcraft factors.119 In determining whether the troika was 
applicable to this case, the district court did examine all of the 
 
Use—The Parallel World of Keyword Ads, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 892–93 (2008). 
 114. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149 (emphasis added). 
 115. Adding additional factors to the troika, instead of selecting new ones, would be 
more logical because the article cited by the Ninth Circuit characterized the troika as 
“inadequate . . . because it omits important factors,” not because it is wholly inapplicable. See 
supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 116. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154. The Sleekcraft factors that the Ninth 
Circuit deemed to be most relevant to the facts of this case were (1) the strength of the mark; 
(2) the evidence of actual confusion; and (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be 
exercised by the purchaser. Id. Note that the fourth factor that the court considered relevant in 
Network Automation, the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding 
context on the screen displaying the results page, was not an original Sleekcraft factor. See supra 
note 7 and accompanying text. 
 117. It is common for appellate courts to develop case law. The bigger problem here is 
the rejection of all three troika factors without sufficient support. 
 118. The Ninth Circuit cited the nonbinding Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. 
Supp. 2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009) as the basis for its fourth factor: “the labeling and 
appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the 
results page.” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154. The court noted one fact from its own 
case, Playboy, which was consistent with the new factor: “Netscape’s search engine did not 
clearly segregate the sponsored advertisements from the objective results.” Id. However, the 
Ninth Circuit did not use that factor to decide Playboy. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape 
Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 119. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154. 
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Sleekcraft factors.120 Brookfield, which established the troika test, 
allowed for “the remaining factors” outside of the troika to “tip the 
scale back the other way.”121 The district court considered troika’s 
built-in flexibility when applying it, but the Ninth Circuit still 
rejected the district court’s findings, implying that the district court 
simply “count[ed] beans.”122 This rejection seems to indicate that 
what the Ninth Circuit really wished for in its call for “flexibility” 
was for different factors to be considered so as to reach a different 
outcome. 
The safest approach for practitioners and judges going forward is 
to apply the troika test only when a case’s fact patterns match exactly 
with prior case law, and to tread carefully otherwise.123 It ought to be 
clear that in any case, “flexibility” should carry the day. But the best 
alternative is simply to undertake a complete Sleekcraft analysis, 
considering both the applicability of individual factors and the total 
number of factors weighing for or against a holding of likelihood of 
confusion. Keeping the flexible approach bounded within Sleekcraft 
would provide adaptability for future technologies as well as 
guidance for those seeking to apply the law. 
2. Determining the law for future technologies 
Flexibility sounds nice, particularly when the legal standard will 
be applied to as yet unknown future contexts. But in reality flexibility 
is unworkable.124 For example, when the district court in Network 
Automation applied the test the Ninth Circuit had previously used in 
the “internet context,”125 its decision was overturned because it was 
 
 120. Id. at 1149–53. 
 121. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
 122. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145 (citing Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. 
SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 123. This Note argues that the district court’s decision to apply the troika in Network was 
in line with precedent, yet the Ninth Circuit still rejected the district court’s reasoning. This 
should cause alarm to those who wish to similarly apply the troika in future Ninth Circuit 
cases. 
 124. Practitioners and courts operate in the real world, where objective standards must be 
available to measure actual fact patterns against. For example, in Network Automation, the 
Ninth Circuit’s “flexibility” resulted in the creation of an entirely new test, which included a 
new, never before applied (in the Ninth Circuit) factor. 638 F.3d at 1154. This is difficult for 
practitioners and judges because before the test is created, they have no guidance as to how to 
apply the law. 
 125. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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not “flexible” in applying the Sleekcraft factors. What the Ninth 
Circuit then did was weigh the Sleekcraft factors in a totally new 
way–and additionally invent a completely new factor–all in the name 
of “flexibility”. To expect a district court to do the same when faced 
with some future, novel application is simply asking too much. If 
flexibility is to include modifying or expanding current tests, the 
Ninth Circuit should have definitively established a method for 
district courts to follow in the future.126 
Even though the Ninth Circuit failed to explicitly outline an 
approach for what standard applies when district courts are faced 
with questions involving new technology, the method that the court 
used to develop the four factor standard for keyword advertising is 
illustrative.127 First, the court undertook a step-by-step analysis of the 
eight Sleekcraft factors, determining one-by-one which factors would 
be most relevant for the issue at hand.128 This analysis of the 
Sleekcraft factors is to be done “flexibly,” remaining “acutely aware 
of excessive rigidity.”129 Second, the court examined “other relevant 
factors.”130 The court focused on the circumstances—considering 
both “what the consumer saw on the screen” and what “[the 
consumer] reasonably believed.”131 By considering whether equity, 
common sense, or the surrounding circumstances might prompt a 
different outcome than the one that the Sleekcraft factors might 
otherwise offer, one may discover those additional relevant factors.132 
 
 126. When a new technology emerges that has never been dealt with in the case law, the 
normal approach is for district courts to examine how the law has dealt with similar 
technologies in the past. The Ninth Circuit completely rejected the district court’s test in 
Network Automation, saying that it should have known to use a different test. This section 
discusses the approach the Ninth Circuit implied district courts should take to know how to 
determine or develop the appropriate test in the future. 
 127. In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit applied a brand new factor, never before 
used in the Ninth Circuit. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. In order for district 
courts to create new factors in the name of “flexibility,” they need some kind of standard 
approach to follow in doing so. 
 128. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149. 
 129. Id. at 1141, 1145 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 
174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 130. Id. at 1153–54. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Ideally, a court should devise a test and apply it consistently no matter the outcome. 
If the court decides the test based on the outcome, outcomes will constantly be unpredictable 
and ever changing. However, when a test is not a rigid one, the test will necessarily be more 
pliable. In internet trademark cases like Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit called for 
flexibility in applying the Sleekcraft factors. With flexibility as a high priority, it seems as 
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The court’s statement that “the linchpin of trademark infringement 
is consumer confusion”133 should prove helpful in considering what 
the outcome of a given case should be, and what factors to apply to 
achieve that equitable outcome. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit erred in reversing the district court, as the 
district court correctly relied on analogous precedent to find that a 
likelihood of initial interest confusion existed in the context of 
search-engine keyword advertising. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is 
troubling not because of the court’s new approach to internet 
trademark law, but rather because in failing to explicitly reject the 
precedents that the district court followed to reach its conclusion, 
the Ninth Circuit left unanswered the question of when to use the 
troika test going forward. While the new test is clearly to be used to 
determine outcomes for trademark issues in the context of internet 
search-engine keywords, the troika test still stands as good law that 
could potentially be applied in future, yet to be determined “internet 
context[s].”134 
Furthermore, even though the Ninth Circuit rejected the lower 
court’s approach, it failed to explicitly provide a method to use when 
developing new legal standards for emerging technologies. Despite 
neglecting to define a methodology for determining which factors to 
consider in trademark cases involving new technology, the court’s 
reasoning suggests one possibility: (1) examine all eight Sleekcraft 
factors using a flexible approach; and (2) examine the surrounding 
circumstances, context, and consumers’ actual beliefs to determine 
what, if any, additional factors ought to be considered. A clearly 
defined approach would give needed guidance to practitioners and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
though equity, common sense, or surrounding circumstances must dictate, at least in part, 
what additional factors ought to be considered in any particular case, particularly one involving 
new technology. 
 133. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154. 
 134. Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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judges who must apply the Ninth Circuit’s “flexibility” standard to 
real-world situations. 
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